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NOTES
to decide over the subject matter - the marital relation-if both of
the spouses voluntarily confer in personam jurisdiction upon the
court. It does not matter that the court in fact lacks jurisdiction
over the subject matter because it is dependent upon at least one
spouse's being domiciled in the state,58 since the decree will be
nevertheless "airtight" whether against an attack within the render-
ing state or in any other state by virtue of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause, whether against an attack by one of the spouses or by third
persons. This development would indicate a growing tendency
toward the liberalization of divorces based upon mutual consent
of the spouses at the cost of states whose laws and public policy
are more conservative in this regard. Whether or not the United
States Supreme Court will sanction such a development remains
to be seen.
FREDERICK R. HODOSH
UNFAIR COMPETITION - COMMON LAW LIABILITY FOR INTERFER-
ENCE WITH PROSPECTIVE BUSINESS RELATIONS. The common law
of unfair competition involves the judicially developed morals
of the market place, founded on the almost Biblical precept: No
man shall reap where he has not sown. Unfair competition is an
abuse of the privilege of free competition, constituting a tort I
or an equitable injury 2 against which an injured competitor can
obtain legal or equitable relief.
TORT THEORY OF ACTION
Tort liability for unfair competition is imposed on the theory
that unfair interference with a competitor's prospective business
relations is an abuse of the privilege of competition.3 This privi-
lege, based on the public policy in favor of free competition, is
an exemption from the general principle that intentional interfer-
ence with the interests of another is a tort. It "rests on the eco-
nomic postulate that free competition is worth more to society
than it costs." 4
The privilege of compeittion was established at common law.
58. Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901).
1. Prosser, Torts §105, pp. 1013-1029 (1941).
2. McClintock, Equity §151, pp. 402-405 (2d ed. 1948).
3. Temperton v. Russell (1893) 1 Q.B. 715, 62 L.J.Q.B. 412, is the leading case.
Prosser, Torts 1014 (1941).
4. Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1, 3 (1894).
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In an anonymous case 5 decided in 1410, an action was brought
ty two established schoolmasters against another schoolmaster who
by setting up a competing school and charging lower fees, attracted
prospective pupils from the plaintiffs' school. The English court
held that the action could not be maintained, one judge declaring
that the defendant's conduct was "a virtuous and charitable thing,
and an ease to the people"; another judge declaring that it "would
be against reason for a master to be hindered from keeping school
where he pleases." I However, in another early case, Dunstable
v. B.,; a defendant was held liable for selling meat in a community
where the plaintiff, the Prior of Dunstable, had a monopoly to
market meat.s
England, at this time, was emerging from the Middle Ages, dur-
ing which monopolies of this kind had frequently been granted
by the Crown as a means of increasing royal power.9 But as Eng-
land was changing from a pastoral into a trading economy, there
slowly developed a public policy, implicit in the Schoolmasters'
case, that unrestricted competition was desirable. A few centuries
of profound change both in economic practice and in economic
theory culminated in the Industrial Revolution during the nine-
teenth century, when public policy in regard to trade could be
summed up in the statement that the best way to regulate trade
was to leave it alone; a policy which fostered unprecedented pro-
duction of economic goods, accompanied by unprecedented cre-
ation of social evils. "The unhappy effects of that policy within
less than a century resulted in the adoption of a compromise - a
policy of government regulation designed to maintain a status of
free and fair competition protecting alike against the dangers of
monopoly and the evils of uncurbed competition." 1o
The privilege of competition has long been a matter of serious
concern in democratic society, and has been limited by a standard
of fairness in the laws of both England and the United States.
"All laws of a democracy are but expressions of a policy drawn,
correctly or otherwise, from human experience. It is therefore to
be expected that the policy they express will change as new ex-
5. Y.B. 11 Hen. IV, f. 47, pl. 21 (1410).
6. Chafee, Unfair Competition, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1289 (1940).
7; Y.B. 11 Hen. VI, f. 19, pl. 13 (1433).
8. Wyman, Competition and the Law, 15 Harv. L. Rev.- 427, 428-429 (1902).
9. Jones, Historical Development of the Law of Business Competition, 36 Yale L.J. 351,
367 (1927).
10. Id. at 383; see 1 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks, 92-93 (1945).
"The prevention of monopoly must be balanced with the necessity of maintaining free
competition and a free market, in determining what constitutes unfair competition."
California Appeal Creators v. Wieder of California, 68 F. Supp. 499, 506 (S.D.N.Y., 1946).
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perience teaches that old policy is mistaken either in factual basis
or functioning." I I
Interference with the business relations of a competitor is, of
course, the very essence of competition, and only where the inter-
ference is regarded as unfair is the competition unprivileged. As
stated by Ames,1'2 "To divert to one's self the customers of a rival
tradesman by the offer of goods at lower prices is, in general, a
legitimate mode of serving one's own interest and justifiable as
fair competition. If, however, a man should start an opposition
shop, not for the sake of profit for himself, but, regardless of loss
to himself, for the sole purpose of driving the plaintiff out of busi-
ness and with the intention of retiring himself immediately upon
the accomplishment of his malevolent purpose, would not this
wanton causing of damage to another be altogether indefensible
and a tort?"
Four years later an affirmative answer to this question was given
in the case of Tuttle v. Buck.'' In that case the plaintiff, who had
established a profitable business as a barber in a small town, re-
fused to rent a building from the defendant. Angered, the defend-
ant set up and financed a rival barber shop for the purpose of
driving the plaintiff out of business, and succeeded. In a tort ac-
tion the plaintiff recovered for the injury to his business relations,
on the ground that the defendant did not have a privilege to inter-
fere, by such method and with such a motive.
Clearly, then, the privilege of competition is limited by a legal
standard of fairness to the method of competition and the motive
of the competitor, and abuse of this privilege is the basis for im-
posing tort liability to the competitor whose business relations
are injured as a consequence. For this reason interference with
the reasonable expectancy of patronage arising from preliminary
negotiations with a prospective buyer is an abuse of the privilege
of competition. Thus, in Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink,14 the plaintiff,
a real estate broker, disclosed the identity of a prospective buyer
to the defendant, a competing real estate broker, who assured him
that the information would be held in strictest confidence. The
defendant afterward induced the prospective buyer to discontinue
negotiations with the plaintiff. In a tort action by the plaintiff,
the court held that the defendant was liable for the commission
11. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 583, 292 N.W. 414, 416 (1940).
12. Ames, How Far an Act May Be a Tort Because of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor,
18 Harv. L. Rev. 411, 420 (1905).
13. 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
14. 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 Atl. 62 (1934).
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which the plaintiff would have earned but for the unfair com-
petition of the defendant. "The wrongful act charged was 'the
malicious interference with [the plaintiffs] business. . . . Natural
justice dictates that a remedy shall be provided for such unjust
interposition in one's business. The luring away, by devious, im-
proper, and unrighteous means, of the customers of another is,
on principle, an actionable wrong,if damage ensues." 1 "Unjusti-
fiable interference with one's right to pursue his lawful business
or occupation, and to reap the earnings of his industry, is forbidden.
The law enjoins the employment of practices that are outside of
the domain of fair trade competition." 10
In a somewhat similar case, Johnson v. Gustafson,1 7 the Minne-
sota court has indicated its willingness to protect, from unprivileged
interference, the prospective economic advantage of a person en-
gaged in lawful business. In this case the owner of a residential
property listed it with the plaintiff, a real estate broker, for sale
at $6,000, of which the plaintiff was to receive $300 as a commis-
sion for procuring a buyer. However, the owner had the right to
sell the property independently without being liable to the plain-
tiff for the commission. The plaintiff interested defendant Clarity
in the property. But Clarity, in order to get it for less by eliminat-
ing the plaintiff's commission, induced defendant Gustafson to
purchase the property directly from the owner for $5,700 with
Clarity's money. The plaintiff brought action against Clarity and
Gustafson for damages, and it was held that they were liable for
the amount of the commission, which the plaintiff would have
earned had it not been for the unfair acts of the defendants. As
the court stated,18 "No man should be permitted to reap a profit-
able crop from seed of the kind here used."
It has become increasingly evident in recent years that public
policy, while it favors free competition, also favors higher stand-
ards of fairness in competition; and higher standards of fairness
have accordingly been applied by the judicial definers of public
policy.19 A method of competition, at one time privileged, may
thus be declared unlawful under a new and higher standard; and
noncompliance with this standard is the basis for allowing dam-
15. Id. at 586, 175 Atl. at 66.
16. Id. at 590-591, 175 AtI. at 68.
17. 201 Minn. 629, 277 N.W. 252 (1938).
18. Id. at 635, 277 N.W. at 255.
19. Louis Kamm, Inc. v. Flink, 113 N.J.L. 582, 175 Atl. 62 (1934); Keviczky v.
Lorber, 290 N.Y. 297, 49 N.E.2d 146 (1948); Goldman v. Feinberg, 130 Conn. 671,
37 A.2d 355 (1944); see Bekken v. Equitable L. Assur. Soc., 70 N.D. 122, 153, 293
N.W. 200, 217 (1940).
NOTES
ages at law.20 But since periodic recovery of damages in repeated
actions at law would be an inadequate remedy to protect con-
tinuing business relations, the remedy in equity is manifestly bet-
ter, providing in one suit both damages for past unfair competition
and an injunction against continuance of such competition.2 1
EQUITY THEORY OF ACTION
In equity, unprivileged interference with business relations is
enjoinable at the suit of an injured competitor, in order to protect
the property right to conduct business without unlawful inter-
ference, 22 or to prevent unjust enrichment..21
1. THEORY OF PROPERTY RIGHT
Injunctive relief is usually granted on the theory that the right
to conduct a business is a property right which equity will pro-
tect from interference by unfair compeition..2 4  For example, in
Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Universal P. Co.,2 5 the plaintiff
was the owner of Madison Square Garden. The defendant, a.
motion picture producer, was authorized by the plaintiff to photo-
graph ice hockey events for use in newsreels only. It produced
without the plaintiff's permission a feature picture using many au-
thentic scenes of hockey games held in the auditorium, as well as
fictitious scenes designed to appear genuine. In advertising the
picture, the defendant made frequent references to Madison Square
Garden. The plaintiff, part of whose business was the licensing
of genuine photographs for use in feature pictures, brought suit.
to enjoin the defendant from showing the picture. The court held
that the plaintiff was entitled to equitable relief, on the ground
that the plaintiff's right to conduct the valuable business of licen.-
ing the use of genuine photographs was a property right protect-
ible in equity from unfair competition.2t
20. Newark Hardware & Plumbing Supp. Co. v. Stove Mfrs. Corp., 136 N.J.L. 401,
56 A.2d 605 (1948), aff'd. 137 N.J.L. 612, 61 A.2d 240 (1948).
21. Walsh, Equity 214 (1930).
22. 1 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks §2.1, pp. 16-18 (1945).
23. 1 id. §60.3, pp. 728-730.
24. McClintock, Equity 402-403 (2d ed. 1948). This right is not property in the.
sense of being a thing; for, as stated by Justice Holmes in Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S.
312, 342 (1921) (dissenting opinion), "An established business no doubt may have
pecuniary value and commonly is protected by law against various unjustified injuries.
But you cannot give it definiteness of contour by calling it a thing. It is a course of
conduct . . ."
25. 255 App. Div. 459, 7 N.Y.S.2d 845 (Ist dep't. 1938).
26. Accord: Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939);
Federal Waste Paper Corp. v. Garment Cent. Capitol, 268 App.Div. 230, 51 N.Y.S.2d 26
(1st Dep't. 1944).
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2. THEORY OF UNJUST ENRICHMENT
The United States Supreme Court has advanced the theory that
one whose business values are-misappropriated by a competitor
is entitled to injunctive relief in order to prevent unjust enrich-
ment -7 The misappropriation by a competitor of the business
values of another person is equivalent to taking the competive
equipment of that person and using it to his injury.28 Recognizing
this fact, the United States Supreme Court, in the leading case of
International News Service v. Associated Press,29 declared that such
misappropriation, by which one competitor unjustly enriches him-
self at the expense of another, constitutes unfair competition en-
titling the injured competitor to injunctive relief. In this case the
plaintiff and the defendant were both engaged in the business of
gathering news and distributing it to member newspapers. The
defendant, by copying from bulletin boards the news gathered by
the plaintiff, and publishing the pirated news in distant cities be-
fore the plaintiff's member newspapers could get the same news
published, was seriously interfering with and damaging the plain-
tiff's business. In a suit to restrain the defendant from continuing
this practice, it was held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief.
The court stated 30 that the defendant "is taking material that has
been acquired by complainant as the result .of organization and
the expenditure of labor, skill, and money . . . and by disposing of
it to newspapers that are competitors of complainant's members
is appropriating to itself the harvest of those who have sown.
Stripped of all disguises, the process amounts to an unauthorized
interference with the normal operation of complainant's legitimate
business precisely at the point where the profit is to be reaped . . .
with special advantage to defendant in the competition because of
the fact that it is not burdened with any part of the expense of
gathering the news.3' The transaction speaks for itself and a court
of equity ought not to hesitate long in characterizing it as unfair
competition in business."32
The statement that a person cannot reap where he has not sown
and cannot appropriate to himself the harvest of those who have
27. Internat'l News Serv. v. Asso. Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
28. 1 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks 722 (1945).
29. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
80. Id. at 239-240.
31. Compare the following statement from a similar news-copying case, Walter v.
Steinkopff [18921 3 Ch. 489, 495: "For the purpose of their own profit they [the de-
fendants] desire to reap where they have not sown, and to take advantage of the labour
and expenditures of the Plaintiffs in procuring news for the purpose of saving labour and
expense to themselves."
32. 1 Callmann, Unfair Competition and Trade-Marks §60.1, pp. 724-725 (1945).
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sown, seems to make enjoinable almost every kind of unfair com-
petition at the suit of the injured competitor. It forms the basis
for a very comprehensive theory of liability, equating "unfair com-
petition" with "unjust enrichment by competition."
This theory has permitted equitable protection to business in-
terests not otherwise protectible. For example, in Waring v. WDAS
Broadcasting Station,- the plaintiff's orchestra had made for sale
to the public phonograph recordings under a contract with a re-
cording company which provided that the records be labelled
"Not licensed for radio broadcast." The defendant radio station
purchased one of the records so labelled, and used it for broad-
cast purposes. The plaintiff brought suit to restrain such broad-
casting, and the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to relief.
The court stated that, although copyright law did not recognize
the right of a performer in artistic interpretations of musical works,
the plaintiff had property rights in its musical renditions, and that
there was no reason why the restriction placed on the use of the
records should not be enforced in equity. After discussing and
relying on the theory advanced in the Associated Press case, the
court stated: 34 "On the facts in the present case . . . we are of
opinion that on the ground of unfair competition, apart from any
other theory of equitable relief, plaintiff is entitled to the injunc-
tion. .. "
Hence, misappropriation of the business values of a competitor
is unfair competition enjoinable at the suit of the injured competi-
tor on the theory that the unfair competitor should not be per-
mitted to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of the injured
competitor. This theory, however, although frequently relied upon
as the basis of decision in unfair competition cases,8 5 on the lead-
ing authority of the Associated Press case, has not been widely
followed.6 But it is manifestly a reasonable and fair theory, and
could well have been applied to give the plaintiff injunctive relief
in the recent case of Walt Disney Productions v. Souvaine Selec-
33. 327 Pa. 433, 194 Ati. 631 (1937); Contra: RCA Mfg. Co. v. Whiteman, 114
F.2d 86 (2d Cir. 1940).
34. Id. at 455-456, 194 Atl. at 641-642.
35. See e.g., Pittsburgh Athletic Co. v. KQV Broadcasting Co., 24 F. Supp. 490 (W.D. Pa.
1938); Metropolitan Opera Ass'n v. Wagner-Nichols R. Corp., 101 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1950);
Twentieth Century S. Club v. Transradio P. Service, 165 Misc. 71, 300 N.Y. Supp. 159
(1937).
36. Callman, He Who Reaps Where He Has Not Sown: Unjust Enrichment in the
Law of Unfair Competition, 55 Harv. L. Rev. 595, 958 (1942); 1 Callmann, Unfair Com-
petition and Trade-Marks §60.2, pp. 725-727 (1945); 1 Nims, Unfair Competition and
Trade-Marks 54-65 (4th ed. 1947).
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tive Pictures.3 7  In this case the plaintiff, an American company,
and the defendant, a French company, each produced a motion
picture entitled Alice in Wonderland based on the Lewis Carroll
book, which was no longer, subject to copyright. Work on both
pictures was begun in 1945. The defendant presented a first show-
ing at Paris of its Anscocolor actor-and-puppet version in 1949.3'
Sometime later the plaintiff completed its Technicolor animated-
drawing version, and several months prior to the first scheduled
showing in New York financed an expensive advertising campaign
to creat public interest in the picture. The defendant then sched-
uled the simultaneous release in New York of its French-made pro-
duction. The plaintiff brought suit to enjoin the showing of the
defendant's picture. But the court held, denying a preliminary in-
junction, that the simultaeous showing of the defendant's Alice in
Wonderland under the same name as the plaintiff's much-adver-
tised version was not unfair competition. "
This decision seems wrong. It is true that there was no attempt
by the defendant to pass off an inferior picture. It is also true that
the plaintiff should not be permitted to secure a virtual monopoly
simply by advertising, because injunctive relief against unfair
competition will be denied where its practical effect is to create a
monopoly. ° But the issue was not whether the plaintiff would
acquire a monopoly by its advertising if an injunction were granted.
The precise issue was whether interference by the defendant with
the prospective business relations of the plaintiff, by taking ad-
vantage of the plaintiff's advertising was fair competition. 1 Ac-
cording to existing theories and prevailing standards of fairness,
such interference is not privileged. Since good will created by
advertising is a business value protectible in equity from inter-
37. 98 F. Supp. 774 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
38. Time, Jul. 16, 1951, p. 90, col. 2.
39. Cf. Snowden v. Noah, Hopk. 347, 2 N.Y. Ch. 446 (1825), where the plaintiff pur-
chased an established New York daily newspaper, called the National Advocate, which
until then had been edited by the defendant at 48 Wall Street. The defendant thereafter
continued to publish a newspaper at the same address, calling his paper the New York
National Advocate and soliciting the patronage of subscribers to the plaintiff's National
Advocate. The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant, but the court held that he
was not entitled to injunctive relief against the publication of the defendant's paper or
the solicitation of the plaintiff's customers, on the ground that these were fair methods
of competition which deceived no one.
40. Pocket Books v. Meyers, 178 Misc. 59, 33 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1942), aff'd. 292 N.Y. 58,
54 N.E.2d 6 (1944).
41. "Perhaps there never was a time when good-will ... has played a more important
part in the theatre of commerce than it plays today . . . when the means of advertising
designed to create good-will were so various and highly developed as today . . . when
there were so many temptations to motivate the trade pirate to endeavor to purloin the
good-will of others for his own profit." American Shops v. American Fashion Shops, 13
N.J.Super. 416 .----- 80 A.2d 575, 579 (1951).
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ference by unfair competition,4 2 the plaintiff in the Disney case
would be entitled to injunctive relief under the unjust enrichment
theory, in order to prevent misappropriation of this business value
by the defendant. '  Furthermore, since good will created by ad-
vertising is a business property right protectible in equity,44 the
plaintiff would be entitled to injunctive relief under the property
right theory, in order to prevent unfair interference with that right
by the defendant. 4' But the court did not consider these theories
in the Disney case.
CONCLUSION
Interests in prospective business relations are sufficiently valu-
able civil rights to merit judicial protection at law and in equity.
Intentional interference with these rights by competition is lawful
so long as it is fair according to judicial standards. These stand-
ards change as public policy in regard to business competition is
modified by social and economic conditions. Under present con-
ditions public policy favors higher standards of fairness, with con-
sequent greater protection to prospective business relations. The
tort theory of action is that the competitor who fails to comply
with these standards of fairness has abused the privilege of com-
petition, and is therefore subject to liability by way of damages to
an injured competitor. The equity theory is that continuing abuse
of the privilege of competition by. an unfair competitor is an un-
lawful interference with the property right to conduct a lawful
business, or is an unlawful misappropriation of the prospective
economic advantage of that business, against which an injunction
is the only adequate remedy. Under both the equity theory and
the tort theory the judicial aim is to make the sower also a reaper.
JOSEPH T. NOAH
42. Chas. H. Elliott Co. v. Skillkrafters, Inc., 271 Pa. 185, 114 Atl. 488 (1921).
43. Lone Ranger, Inc. v. Cox, 124 F.2d 650 (4th Cir. 1942); Beecham v. London
Gramophone Corp., 104 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1951).
44. Paramount Pictures v. Leader Press, 106 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1939); "The money
invested in advertising is as much a part of the business as if invested in buildings, or
machinery, and a rival in business has no more right to use the one than the other-no
mnore right to use the machinery by which the goods are placed on the market than the
machinery which originally created them." Hilson Co. v. Foster, 80 Fed. 896, 897
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1897).
45. Goldwyn Pictures Corporation v. Goldwyn, 296 Fed. 391 (2d Cir. 1924); J. B.
Liebman & Co. v. Liebman, 135 N.J.Eq. 288, 38 4-.2d 187 (1944).
